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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction for theft, a third degree
felony, entered on December 8, 1997, by the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the

State's case should have been granted because the wholly circumstantial evidence did
not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and did not provide evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find the elements of the crime had been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
2.

Whether Defendant's conviction for felony theft should be reduced to

misdemeanor theft because there was no evidence that the fair market value of the
surveillance equipment exceeded $1,000.00 on the date it was stolen.
The standard of review for both issues is whether the evidence, without
speculation or conjecture, was sufficiently inconclusive that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted. State v. Brown, 324 Utah Adv. Rpt. 14 (Utah 1997). This issue was
preserved for appeal in the district court at Record, pp. 1212-1213.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant, Dr Lyman, was charged in a one-count Amended Information
with theft of property with a value exceeding $1,000 00, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-6-412(1 )(b)(i) The theft allegedly related to a certain
camera, VCR and miscellaneous other electronic wires and cables taken from the
Lifephase Fitness Center in Cedar City, Utah on April 6, 1996
On July 1, 1997, after a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged On
December 8, 1997, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a period of zero (0)
to five (5) years and fined $5,000 00 Execution of the sentence was suspended and
Defendant was placed on probation for a period of thirty-six (36) months, with certain
conditions, including service of thirty (30) days in jail and payment of a $2,000 00 fine
This appeal followed
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State's theory of the case was that Dr Lyman was viewing female
customers of the Lifephase Fitness Center (of which he was co-owner) through a small
1/4" slit below an electrical outlet in a maintenance closet adjoining the tanning room
In an effort to catch Defendant in the act, the Iron County Sheriff's office placed
surveillance equipment in the maintenance closet, focused on the slit in the wall
According to Detective Stapley, when he returned to retrieve the camera the next day,
the surveillance equipment was gone Defendant was subsequently charged with theft
of the equipment
2

The State's evidence at trial, through its principal witnesses, was as follows:
1.

Michelle Komarek:
Ms. Komarek testified that she taught aerobics at the Lifephase Fitness

Center. At some point in time, she noticed a small hole under the wall plug socket in
the tanning room and advised a Cedar City policeman, Kevin Minefee, of that fact. She
has never been in the maintenance closet and has never seen Dr. Lyman go in the
closet. (Record, pp. 932-933, 938.) She testified that the maintenance closet next
door to the tanning room was not locked. Further, she was not at the fitness center at
all on April 5 or April 6, the days in question. (Record, p. 939.)
2.

Kevin Minefee:
Mr. Minefee was a police officer with the Cedar City Police Department at

the time. He noticed a one-quarter inch slit in the wall in the maintenance closet. He
had to get down on his hands and knees to look through the hole. (Record, pp. 948949.)
3.

Stacie Bradshaw:
Ms. Bradshaw is a 25-year-old aerobics instructor at the Lifephase

Fitness Center. She was not at the center on April 5, 1996. (Record, p. 952.) On
Saturday morning, April 6, 1996, Ms. Bradshaw worked out and taught a class. She
saw Dr. Lyman at the fitness center that morning. She has never seen him in the
maintenance closet. Further, she has never used the tanning room, nor has she ever
been in the maintenance closet. (Record, pp. 961-962.)
3

4.

Mark Hansen:
Mr. Hansen is a trainer and sales manager at the Lifephase Fitness

Center. He had no knowledge of the slit in the maintenance closet. He did know,
however, that the maintenance closet was not locked. He testified that he and other
people had access to the fitness center with keys and that guests of the fitness center
would, on occasion, go into the maintenance closet to get brooms to sweep the
racquetbail courts. (Record, pp. 970, 973-974, 978, 980, 985.) Mr. Hansen at no time
saw the Defendant carry anything out of the fitness center. (Record, p. 986.)
5.

Steve Brown:
Mr. Brown and his wife are co-owners of the Lifephase Fitness Center,

along with Dr. Lyman and his wife. Mr. Brown was not present at the fitness center on
April 5 or April 6, 1996. When he was advised of the slit in the maintenance closet
wall, he went to look for it and did not see it from the tanning side. (Record, p. 989.)
From the maintenance closet side, the small hole looked like an overcut made by
workmen at the time of installation of the wall socket. (Record, p. 997.) He further
testified that there were a number of keys out to people who could have had access to
the fitness center. (Record, p. 1005.)
6.

Paula Douglas Stapley:
Ms. Stapley was, at the time of trial, married to the principal investigating

police officer in this case. Back in April 1996, she worked for the Cedar City Police
Department. After a light workout, she made arrangements with the Defendant to use
4

the tanning room around 10:00 a.m. She went to the tanning room and, after being in
the tanning bed for seven to ten minutes, she heard a noise coming from the
maintenance closet. (Record, pp. 1042-1045.) She spent 20 minutes in the tanning
bed, got out, dressed, turned off the fan and radio and left the room. (Record, p. 1046.)
She looked around for Dr. Lyman and did not see him. She left the fitness center
around 11:05 a.m. (Record, p. 1057.) Although she had been a member of the fitness
center for several years, she had never noticed the slit under the wall socket in the
tanning room before April 5, 1996. (Record, p. 1059.)
7.

Roy Houchen:
Mr. Houchen was an investigator with the Iron County Narcotics Task

Force who provided the surveillance equipment in this case. He provided purchase
orders for some of the various pieces of equipment used in this case. The total on the
invoices when the electronic surveillance equipment was originally purchased in 1989
and 1995 was $1,257.73. According to Mr. Houchen, the breakout on value by
purchase invoice and date purchased was as follows:
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Equipment

Original Purchase
Price

Pin-hole camera
Variable focus lens
Monitor
Cable
Power adapter
Power adapter
Power strip
VCR/Recorder
Breakout box
2 video cables @ $7.25/each

$

298.33
198.46
289.54
13.33
43.50
46.15
25.00
288.00
40.92
14.50

$

1,257.73

TOTAL

Date Purchased
(Approximate)
8/10/95
8/10/95
8/10/95
11/1/95
11/1/95
11/1/95
none provided
1/18/89
10/25/95
10/25/95

(Record, pp. 1070-1084, 1090-1092.) Mr. Houchen had only three checks evidencing
the purchases, as follows: One for $25, one for $62.27 and one for $55.42, for a total

of $142.69.
Mr. Houchen clearly testified that he did not know what the fair market value of
the electronic equipment would have been on or about April 6, 1996. (Record, pp.
1092, 1094-1095.) Specifically, he testified as follows:
Q

(By Mr. Nielson) So you don't know what [the] fair
market value [of the equipment] is today?

A

l--it would be just a guess. I don't know.

Q

And you wouldn't know what the fair market value
would be as of April 6 of '96?

A

No.

Q

It is fair to say, isn't it, that used surveillance
equipment of this type is—is worth less today or on
April the 6th of '96 than it was when you bought it?
6

A

That would be fair, yes.

Q

Are you prepared to tell us today how-what that
would be? Don't--l guess your testimony is you don't
know.

A

I don't know what it would be, no.

(Record, p. 1094, lines 4-18.)

Q

(By Mr. Nielson) You would agree with me, though,
wouldn't you, that a fair market value of all this
equipment is less than $1,257.73?

A

If you were selling it, yes, as used equipment it would
be less, yes.

Q

Are you prepared to testify about how much less?

A

No.

Q

Substantially less, though, would it not be? An eightyear-old VCR?

A

I don't know. I don't know what the value would be.

(Record, p. 1095, lines 4-14.) No other purported evidence was offered by the State
regarding the value on or about April 6, 1996.
8.

Kenneth Stapley:
Mr. Stapley was a detective with the Cedar City Police Department at the

time. He testified about the setup of the surveillance equipment in the maintenance
closet at the Lifephase Fitness Center. (Record, pp. 1110-1123.) He further testified
that after discovering the camera and related equipment was missing, he went to talk to

Dr. Lyman at his home about that matter. While there, Mr. Stapley searched
Dr. Lyman's home, vehicle and, later, searched the fitness center and did not locate
any equipment. Finally, Mr. Stapley testified that when he returned to the Lifephase
Fitness Center that night, he noticed that the slit had been spackled on both sides. The
spackle was still damp to the touch at 10:30 p.m. (Record, pp. 1128-1131.)
9.

Chris Delahunty:
Mr. Delahunty is Dr. Lyman's brother-in-law (his wife's sister is

Dr. Lyman's wife). Mr. Delahunty worked at the Lifephase Fitness Center for three
months on and off at the front desk answering phones and doing light maintenance and
repair work. (Record, p. 1174.) Between 9:00 and 9:30 a.m. on Saturday, April 6,
1996, he engaged in small talk with Dr. Lyman in the hallway close to the tanning room
while Dr. Lyman was close to or in the doorway of the maintenance closet. (Record,
pp. 1186-1188.) At 11:00 a.m., when Mr. Delahunty was doing repair work to the
carpet in the aerobics room upstairs, Dr. Lyman came and asked if he could borrow a
spackling knife or putty knife from Mr. Delahunty. Mr. Delahunty testified that
Dr. Lyman was holding a gallon of sheetrock compound, or joint mud, as he called it.
He gave Dr. Lyman the putty knife and Dr. Lyman returned with it around 11:30 a.m.,
thanked him and gave him back the knife. Mr. Delahunty saw Dr. Lyman on and off
quite a few times that morning. (Record, pp. 1201-1203.) He never saw Dr. Lyman go
in the maintenance closet and fully close the door or stay inside for any period of time.
(Record, p. 1208.)
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At the close of the State's case, Defendant made a motion for judgment of
acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence generally, and on the issue of the
fair market value of the equipment on the day of the theft, specifically (Record, pp

1212-1216)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The circumstantial evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury
verdict First, without speculation or conjecture, the circumstantial evidence was
inconclusive as to who stole the surveillance equipment, and did not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence Second, no evidence at all was presented on the
element of the fair market value of the equipment on the date it was stolen
Consequently, the jury had to impermissibly speculate in order to convict the
Defendant
ARGUMENT
I
THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WAS
NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY VERDICT
It is well-established that "the fabric of evidence against the defendant must
cover the gap between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch
the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go But this does not mean that the court can take
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a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict" State v
Petree, 659 P 2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983), State v Smith, 927 P 2d 649 (Utah App
1996)
A guilty verdict is thus not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give
rise to only remote speculative possibilities of guilt State v Workman, 852 P 2d 981,
985 (Utah 1993) While a court should not second-gue,

the jury's credibility

determinations nor, ordinarily, reassess the jury's conclusions about the weight of the
evidence presented, the evidence supporting a jury verdict must be substantial, raising
more than a mere suspicion of guilt United States v Yoakam, 116 F 3d 1346 (10th
Cir 1997), United States v Leos-Quijada, 107 F 3d 786 (10th Cir 1997) Further, even
though a jury may draw reasonable inferences from direct and circumstantial evidence,
such inferences must be more than speculation and conjecture in order to be
reasonable, and the conviction must not be obtained by piling inference upon
inference Id at 794 When the verdict is based entirely on circumstantial evidence,
as here, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's
innocence so as to leave only one reasonable conclusion, that of guilt See State v
John, 586 P 2d 410 (Utah 1978) 1 Put differently, would a reasonable jury find the

The jury was not instructed in the present case that it must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than the Defendant's guilt See Jury Instructions,
(Record, pp 1270, 1275)
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evidence inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence? United States
v Navar, 611 F 2d 1156, 1190 (5th Cir 1980)
In this case, the circumstantial evidence-the only evidence-did no more than
raise, at best, speculation and conjecture regarding Dr Lyman's commission of the
offense As in Yoakam, a similar case in which the conviction was reversed by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, there was sufficient evidence that the offense had been
committed but the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed it Defendant
Yoakam owned 25 percent of Tholen's Supply Company The defendant had
negotiated to purchase the remaining 75 percent ownership for $400,000 and had
completed the necessary paperwork for a Small Business Administration loan of
$450,000 On the evening the agreement was to be finalized, the supply company
burned to the ground
The government advanced a number of theories concerning Mr Yoakam's
motivation to commit the arson, / e that he was in financial trouble and did it to avoid
the significant financial liabilities he was about to assume by acquiring ownership of the
business, and that he was the last person out of the building, just moments behind his
employees, before the fire was started Thus, there was arguably motive and
opportunity for Yoakam to have committed the arson-just no evidence to prove he had
done so

11

As the Tenth Circuit noted, however, this kind of evidence cannot establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense. Yoakam, supra,
116 F.3d at 1350. A conviction based on speculation and conjecture has no foundation
and cannot stand. Id. "Mere presence . . . may create suspicion but it does not
establish participation or guilt." Id. at 4-5, quoting from, United States v. McMahon, 562
F.2d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 1977). "Although the jury is free to draw inferences from
circumstantial evidence, those inferences must be more than mere speculation and
conjecture in order to be reasonable." Id.
Similarly, in this case, there was no evidence that Dr. Lyman committed the
offense. There was no direct evidence linking him to the theft of the camera. The only
fact in evidence to distinguish Dr. Lyman from others working at the fitness center on
the day in question was the testimony of Mr. Delahunty that Defendant requested a
spackling knife and had a can of spackling compound in his possession. Assuming this
fact to be true, in order to find Defendant guilty of theft, the jury had to first leap across
an evidentiary gap to the conclusion that Dr. Lyman used the spackling knife and
compound to spackle the slit in the wall between the maintenance closet and the
tanning room. But even if the jury had made this leap, the Defendant still would not be
guilty. In fact, the trial court indicated its agreement on this point in its Memorandum
Decision on Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover.
that:
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In that decision, the Court noted

The fact that the Defendant may have covered the hole does
not mean he engaged in criminal conduct. Repairing such a
hole in one's own business is at least as consistent with
lawful conduct as with criminal conduct.
(Record, p. 338.)
Accordingly, the jury had to also necessarily and impermissibly leap across an
even bigger evidentiary gap in order to conclude that the person who spackled the slit
was the same person who stole the surveillance equipment, and that Defendant was
that person. While Mr. Delahunty's testimony may have raised some speculation,
suspicion and conjecture regarding Mr. Lyman, it was hardly sufficient to convict
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1991)
(evidence of purchase of drug was insufficient to establish substantial step toward
attempted murder where there was no evidence as to what defendant did, or attempted
to do, with the drug.)
As the Tenth Circuit has stated:
To be sufficient, the conviction evidence must be
substantial. In examining the evidence to determine
whether it is substantial for purposes under consideration, it
must do more than merely raise a suspicion of the existence
of the facts sought to be proved; there must be more
established than a mere suspicion of guilt... And, conviction
cannot be based upon evidence which is consistent with
both innocence and guilt.

Unless the jury drew an adverse inference from Dr. Lyman's exercise of
his constitutional right not to testify (which, of course, it could not legally do), it could
not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence was inconsistent with
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Navar, supra.
13

Lewis v. United States, 420 F.2d 1089, 1090 (10th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added). In
Lewis, the question was whether the defendant formed a prior intent to steal a car he
was working on in a garage in Arkansas before he transported the car across the state
line to his home in Oklahoma. The Court noted that, "it could be inferred from all the
other evidence that Lewis formed a prior intent to steal the car. But there is an equally
logical and consistent inference that the trip began as a legitimate road test and
concluded as something less. At most the evidence adduced at trial shows there could
have been a felonious taking and that the intent might have been extant... [T]he
permissible inferences on the "stolen" car issue are as consistent with innocence as
with guilt, causing the verdict to fail under the substantial evidence test. Id. The Court
stated that, "the jury should never have been required to speculate on the guilt or
innocence of Lewis." Id.
That is precisely what the jury was permitted to do in this case. As already
noted, the only 'evidence' that would give rise to an inference that Dr. Lyman stole the
camera was the testimony that he was seen with a can of joint compound and a
spackling knife on the day in question. As in Lewis, supra, even assuming, arguendo,
that the jury could infer from such evidence that the Defendant spackled the hole, such
evidence is at least as consistent with innocence as with guilt. Lewis, supra, at 1091.
In this case, the State was required to produce substantial evidence which was
sufficient for the jury to conclude that Dr. Lyman stole the surveillance equipment. It
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failed to do so, leaving the jury to speculate about his guilt, which requires reversal of
his conviction.
II

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE
ON THE DATE OF THE THEFT
There was no evidence whatsoever that the fair market value of the items
exceeded $1,000.00 on the day in question, April 6, 1996.3 The only evidence
proffered on value was the original cost of the equipment, some of which was more
than seven years old. Under State v. Logan, 563 P 2d 811 (Utah 1977), there must be
sufficient evidence concerning the fair market value on the date of the alleged offense
in order to sustain a jury verdict. Here, the only witness testifying on the issue of value,
Mr. Houchen, testified candidly and clearly that he did not know what the fair market
value of the items was on the date of the theft. Thus, there is no evidence on this
critical element and the felony conviction cannot stand.
Several courts have addressed this same issue. As the Court noted in United
States v. Thweatt, 433 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1970):
A fact which distinguishes a violation punishable by
imprisonment for not more than one year from a violation
punishable by imprisonment for ten years cannot be
permitted to rest upon conjecture or surmise. In order to

3

The only difference between a third degree felony and a Class A
misdemeanor is the value of the property stolen. Compare Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-412(1 )(b)(i) with § 76-6-412(c).
15

sustain the imposition of the higher penalty, it was as
incumbent upon the Government to prove a value in excess
of a hundred dollars as it was to prove the identity of the
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime, or the ownership
of the property.
Id. at 1232 (quoting from United States v. Wilson, 284 F.2d 407, 408 (4th Cir. 1960).
The Court went on to hold that "this rule is eminently sound: when there is a possibility
of convicting a defendant of either grand or petit larceny-offenses which carry
significantly different penalties and which are distinguished solely by the value of the
property taken-it is essential that the government introduce evidence of that value in
order to give the jury a firm basis upon which it can render a verdict." Id. at 1233.
The jury's verdict about value must not be based on speculation. In Zellers v.
United States, 682 A.2d 1118 (D.C. 1996) the Court held that it has "been very strict in
requiring affirmative proof of value, especially when the value alleged is close to the
line dividing one from the other." Id. at 1121. The Court thus reversed a grand larceny
conviction because evidence showing that the television set originally cost $640.00
would not prove that its value at the time of the theft, twenty-one months later, was
$250.00 or more, even if it was in "almost mint" condition.
Moreover, even though juries can apply their common knowledge in some
instances, that is not a substitute for the requirement that the State present evidence
on the issue of fair market value at the time of the theft. This was explained in Cannon
v. State, 578 S.W.2d 20 (Ark. 1979) as follows:
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Experience and common knowledge are only to be applied
to evidence adduced. . .It is not proper to leave a jury to the
individual ideas of the jurors to determine value.
We have heretofore rejected the idea that common
knowledge and experience can serve as a substitute for
evidence of value which is a necessary element of the
crime, insofar as the grade of the offense is concerned,
holding that it was as incumbent upon the state in a larceny
case to establish a value in excess of the diacritical amount
as it was to prove the identity of the thief and the ownership
of the property.
Id. at 22. (Emphasis added.) In Cannon, the owner had testified that she did not know
the value of the car on the day in question, and so the conviction was reduced. See
also, Porter v. State, 341 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. App. 1977) (where owner of items stolen
testified that she did not know their value at the time of the theft, testimony as to
approximate purchase price was insufficient to establish market value on the date of
the alleged theft); Mason v. State, 262 A.2d 576 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (where
owner of automobile testified that he had purchased the car for $795.00 a year prior to
the time it was stolen, but did not know the value of the automobile when it was stolen,
grand larceny conviction reversed); Negron v. State, 306 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1974)
(testimony as to cost of stolen articles insufficient to establish value at time of theft,
grand larceny conviction therefore reduced to petty larceny).
In summary, in this case there was no evidence on the essential element of the
value of the electronic surveillance equipment on the date of the theft, which element
separates the substantially more serious felony theft conviction from a lesser
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misdemeanor conviction. The jury cannot be left to its own "experience and
knowledge" in the absence of any evidence upon which to conclude that the aggregate
value of the surveillance equipment exceeded $1,000.00 on the critical date. This is
particularly true when some of the equipment was more than seven years old and the
aggregate value was close to the dividing line between a felony and a misdemeanor.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully requested that the Defendant's
conviction be reversed or, in the alternative, that it be reduced to a misdemeanor.
No addendum is necessary pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of
Appellant Procedure.
Dated this / ? * ^ d a v of March, 1998.
CLYDE, SNOW & SWENSON

RODNEY G. SNOW
NEIL A. KAPLAN
ANNELI R. SMITH
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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